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Historicizing Security – Entering the  
Conspiracy Dispositive 
Beatrice de Graaf & Cornel Zwierlein ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Historisierung von Sicherheit – Ein Versuch zur Einführung des 
Verschwörungsdispositivs«. This introduction offers a brief historiographic ac-
count on current histories of security. A case is made for historians to rely more 
on and profit from recent theories and concepts in political science, most nota-
bly the concepts invented by the Copenhagen School on securitization. Fur-
thermore, an attempt is made to ‘historicize security’ and provide some new 
methodological perspectives, in particular the idea of connecting security to 
conspiracy as an operational dispositive for analyzing instances of security poli-
cy making. 
Keywords: securitization, security history, conspiracy, legitimacy. 
1.  Introduction 
Security is not just the outcome of physical or political circumstances and 
incidents. People and organisations have to attribute meaning to those circum-
stances and incidents. They have to be incorporated into political, administra-
tive and bureaucratic decision-making-processes and procedures. This may 
seem obvious. But the history of security is usually not described in these 
terms. Histories of conflict and security usually focus on the key moments of 
change in the development of security-policy; without taking into account how 
complex the development process actually was. Another question that is often 
sidestepped is the question if those new laws, measures and organisations could 
have taken a different shape.  
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To clarify in what direction this Special Issue on security and conspiracy is 
geared, we will start with a brief historiographic account on current histories of 
security. Next, we will shortly touch upon how history can profit from recent 
theories and concepts in political science. In doing so, we will attempt to ‘his-
toricize security’ and provide some new perspectives, in particular the idea of 
connecting security to conspiracy as an operational dispositive. 
2.  State of Art in the History of Security  
Since the 19th century the political sciences and criminal sciences have defined 
their research field as the domain of securing the “public order” and protecting 
society against violence and criminality (Cohen 1985; Foucault 1991; Garland 
2002; Härter 2010; Jaschke 1991; Lange 1999; Lange, Ohly and Reichertz 
2009). Security is a concept long associated solely with notions of national 
security, but in recent decades, the concept has emerged in social science as a 
more general concept denoting, on the one hand, objective and subjective safe-
ty in a variety of contexts and on various levels. On the other hand, it has 
emerged as a concept of governing (cf. Neocleous 2008; Simon 2007). Partly in 
relation to the recent publication of Foucault’s work on “security” in its 19th 
century meaning (Foucault 2004), security has become a concept guiding work 
in sociology and, especially, criminology. As Zedner (2009) argues, security is 
now a key concept to understand contemporary forms of governing in relation 
to a wide variety of social issues of which crime is only one example. Some 
therefore speak of a “security society” or of a related “society of control” 
(Deleuze 1995) that involves “hyper-securitization” (Dean 2007). Such per-
spectives indicate the relevance of security in contemporary social life, but they 
have as yet done little to promote the systematic empirical study of the process 
of securitization. 
In the realm of International Relations (IR), Security Studies emerged as a 
social science discipline in the 1950s, focusing on protecting against external 
threats, border infringement, and military attacks (Frei 1977; Haftendorn 1983; 
Böckenförde and Gareis 2009; Haftendorn 1991; Buzan 1991; Walt 1991; 
Waever and Buzan 2007). Security and conflict have historically been key 
preoccupations of political science in general and its sub-discipline of inter-
national relations (IR) in particular. In this tradition, security threats are con-
ceptualized as objective conditions of danger that require countering through 
rationally calculated state action. States are considered rational calculative 
actors facing an anarchic international system, where survival depends on 
conflict, bargaining, or cooperation (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979). 
IR studies were embedded within the realist dictum and dogma of the “secu-
rity paradox”: the dilemma coined by John Herz, according to which the one 
state’s striving for security inhibits the other’s, thereby inserting endemic chaos 
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and insecurity into the international system as a whole (Herz 1950). In this 
realist view on security politics, that prevails until today, security was often 
defined in an essentialist sense, as a natural, God-given order of things, of 
natural “statist” needs for autonomy and sovereignty, as mirroring national 
interests that could be computed by counting natural resources as compared to 
those of neighboring states (Krasner 1978; Smoke 1987). Since the 1970s, the 
concept of security was expanded with social, cultural, and economical notions, 
but it was still defined in a timeless, statist sense (Tuchman Mathews 1989; 
Mondale 1974; Myers 1989; Axworthy 1997). However, regarding contempo-
rary security surprises, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold 
War, or the emergence of jihadist terrorism, (neo-)realist security scholars have 
been severely criticized for not having been able to predict these security fail-
ures (Gaddis 1992; Gaddis 1997; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995). 
Only after the constructivist turn took hold within the IR field and the disci-
pline of Critical Security Studies emerged in the 1990s was the concept of 
“security” increasingly seen as the outcome of a process of historical contin-
gency and social construction (Waever 1989; Daase 1993; Katzenstein 1996; 
Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998; Weldes et al. 1999).  
Even though the realist perspective was dominant within both political sci-
ence and history, there have been critical researchers who viewed the concept 
of security from a non-static, non-realist/positivist perspective. One of the most 
prominent contributions to new ways of research in the field of security has 
been made by the German historian Werner Conze. In 1984, he published an 
important chapter on ‘Sicherheit’ in the influential handbook Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. According to Conze, the concept of ‘securitas’ played only a 
minor role in daily life during the Middle Ages. At that time, ‘pax’ was the 
dominant concept, which referred to a status of spiritual order and peace and 
which was related to a geographically limited form of territorial peace or secu-
rity. Only after the Wars of Religion in the seventeenth century, security be-
came one of the main arguments for the new modern states to expand and legit-
imize their reign and authority. The object of security-policy shifted from 
regulating personal relations and security (think of escort letters that medieval 
travellers carried with them to guarantee their immunity and safety from other 
landlords) towards a more territorial and geographical sense of security. From 
the eighteenth century onwards, society at large increasingly became the object 
of security policy (Daase 2012). 
Besides Conze, the historicizing of security hardly developed in a theoretical 
sense. What did happen is that the concept of ‘risk’ took the center stage in the 
area of security-studies (Bernstein 1996). Nonetheless, the history of risk fo-
cused mainly on thinking about health and environmental risks and natural or 
technical disasters (Zwierlein 2011; Bennassar 1996; Favier 2002; Kempe and 
Rohr 2003).  
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The history of security in the classic sense received a new boost after the 
(social) constructivists gained ground in the field of IR. With the constructivists 
came the theory of Critical Security Studies in the nineties. Within this area of 
research, security was no longer viewed as a static concept, but as the result of 
a process of historical contingencies and social construction.  
The critical turn in security studies from the mid-1990s onward substantially 
challenged the received notions of security within political science and opened 
up important new directions of research. The 1998 publication of Security: A 
New Framework of Analysis, by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wide 
can be considered a watershed in this respect (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 212-
18). This analysis points out that “danger” is not an objectively existing condi-
tion, but that “danger” requires social processes of mediation before it can 
become a broad societal concern, and before it becomes politically actionable. 
The “Copenhagen School” postulates security as an intersubjective concept that 
is called into existence by “speech acts” of relevant actors, be they authorities, 
parties, ministers, or other important figures. A security problem is perceived 
as an event or situation deviating from the normal order of things. If enough 
critical mass is assumed, the problem is operationalized into a policy and an 
encompassing series of action steps.  
Here, security is reconceptualized as a “speech act,” the utterance of which 
is politically situated and the effects of which condition exceptional and some-
times post-democratic political responses. Through this process of securitiza-
tion, the security problem is tackled or solved; institutions adapt to the new 
threat; or audiences just lose interest; or in the worst case scenario, the case is 
lost and a new reproductive structure emerges (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 
1998; Bonacker and Bernhardt 2006, 219-42). The interesting point for histori-
ans here is that security in this sense has undergone transformation; it has been 
turned from an absolutist entity or quality into a dynamic, communicational, 
and intersubjective process. Only when enough people agree on what consti-
tutes a “security breach” does the process of securitization “work.” In this 
sense, the method leaves room for failing processes, processes of desecuritiza-
tion, or even counter-securitization (Balzacq 2011; Conze 2012). 
The concept of “securitization” signifies these broad social and political 
processes that make danger knowable and actionable. Thus, the securitization 
literature reconceptualizes security from a rationally directed state response to 
an objectively existing danger, to a socially embedded and historically contin-
gent process of meaning-making and political negotiation (Waever 1995; Wil-
liams 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Campbell 
1992; Balzacq 2005; 2011). 
This work can be seen as part of a broader reorientation of the discipline of 
international relations toward the study of social processes that construct secu-
rity threats and formulate state interests and agendas (Alker and Shapiro 1996; 
Weldes et al. 1999; Neumann 1999). These literatures have successfully stud-
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ied contemporary warfare as closely related to practices of “othering” (Camp-
bell 1998; Hansen 2006).  
The domain of critical security studies has significantly expanded in recent 
years, with increasing attention for the intersection between security and risk in 
state practice and policy making (Aradau et al. 2008; Amoore and De Goede 
2008a; De Goede 2004; Amoore 2004). These literatures have questioned the 
dividing line between security as a practice focused on potentially existing 
threats to the life of the nation, and risk as a mundane technology of governing. 
They have drawn attention to the increasingly important focus on risk in state 
security practice; for example, in the operation of modern border security; the 
protection of critical infrastructures; the politics of the war on terror; and global 
processes of financial (re)bordering (Amoore 2006; Aradau and Van Munster 
2007; Salter 2008; Kessler and Werner 2008; Lobo-Guerrero 2011). Others, 
including Peter Burgess, have explored how threat and insecurity are related to 
society’s values, ethics and lifestyles (Burgess 2002; 2011). 
This line of research, which has received some criticism over the years, does 
offer some interesting links for historians, because the ‘Copenhagen School’ 
created a valuable set of tools to create a map of security as a dynamic, com-
municative and intersubjective process. Also, the theory (or the methodology of 
securitization) provides space for research into the questions of why the pro-
cess of agenda-setting of security-issues works in some cases and does not 
work in others; and when can we speak of ‘counter-securitization’ or even ‘de-
securitization’? When does security disappear from the agenda? Or how and 
why does security-policy create conflicting positions or even radicalisation of 
‘securitized’ minorities? 
3.  Historicizing Security 
For us historians, the value of both Conze’s and the Copenhagen School’s 
contributions lies in their call to view security-policy not as a ‘black box’, 
where only the outcomes are relevant, but to devote our attention to the under-
lying processes: the historical contingencies, the public administrative, the 
political and the personal choices that lead to different policies in different 
countries in different times – even when threats and incidents are similar.  
The downside of the ‘Copenhagen School’ perspective is that their research 
focuses mainly on the very recent present – and thereby it poses processes of 
securitization as something new and unique. Additionally, the theory of securit-
ization runs the risk of becoming such a broad theoretical framework, that it is 
always applicable and thus rendered meaningless. Therefore, it is our task as 
historians, to take the ideas of the Danish and Dutch researchers, and use it not 
as a mandatory framework, but as a useful conceptual ‘tool kit’, in which all  
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the individual parts of the process of securitization offer valuable insights for a 
more systemic analysis over time.  
In this short introduction, we would like to offer two conceptual directions 
that can offer some valuable insights for the moderate constructivists among us 
and contribute to the historicizing security: the idea of the ‘security dispositive’ 
and the connection between this dispositive and the notion of political legiti-
macy. Historicizing security aims to place both the process and the outcomes of 
security policy in a historical context, and to deconstruct how these policies 
and ideas developed in debate, discourse and practice.  
3.1  The Operationalization of Security Dispositives in History 
To ensure a better understanding of the development of security-policy over 
time, we need a consistent working definition of security which can be further 
operationalized – contrary to other definitions. Such a working definition, 
which in my opinion does justice to the complexity and dynamics of security, 
has been provided by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. In the seventies, 
Foucault introduced the concept ‘dispositif’, as a means to gain insight into the 
practices of power and knowledge in modern societies (Foucault 1977; 2007; 
also Aradau and Van Munster 2007; 2011).  
For Foucault, a dispositive is “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble con-
sisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault 
1980, 194). For Foucault, the notion of the dispositive was a way to grasp and 
analyze the ensemble of power relations at distinct historical moments, without 
reducing them to a fully coherent or overarching structure. The dispositive, 
moreover, is understood as a social formation that has “as its main function” at 
a given historical moment “that of responding to an urgent need” (Foucault 
1980, 195). In this sense, the concept of the dispositive lends itself exceptional-
ly well to the analysis of past and present security practice, which similarly 
sees itself as responding to urgent threats and fundamental societal needs. 
The lens of the security dispositive brings into focus locally embedded secu-
rity concepts, practices, and emotions that are invoked in the name of potential 
future threats. It makes it possible to identify and analyze the precise interplay 
of security’s administrative practices, legal categorizations, cultural imagina-
tions, and calculative technologies, all of which are historically contingent. 
These dispositives comprise systems of relations that allow authorities and/or 
societies both to perceive and identify the security problem and to invent strat-
egies to respond to it. As Foucault puts it: the dispositive “is thus always in-
scribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of 
knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is 
what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and 
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supported by, types of knowledge” (1980, 195-6). The unique character of 
security dispositives is their postulated urgency, immediacy, and inevitability, 
which is caused by the impending security breaches that are invoked and imag-
ined. Security dispositives draw upon and produce specific forms of knowledge 
and techniques for anticipating, monitoring, and preventing alleged threats. 
Crime-fighting, critical infrastructure protection, as well as counterterrorism, 
are examples of such dispositives. 
Security (and safety) can be defined as the anticipated state of being un-
harmed in the future (Schinkel 2013). Security is at heart a temporal notion 
because “security turns its eye exclusively to the future” (Bentham cited in 
Zedner 2009, 29). Security considerations and risk calculations are projected to 
the future, but have profound relevance in the present because future states of 
(in)security, of famine, drought, or war, are projected to enable acting in the 
present (Schinkel 2013). Thus, projected future states of insecurity or unsafety 
tell us more about society’s lived, existential worries, fears, and values now 
than about objective notions of threat and safety in a stated future. Consequent-
ly, in analyzing concepts and dimensions of security, it is not enough to con-
centrate on war and peace or on the presence or absence of threats in a given 
period. We also have to consider subjective and psychological emotions and 
expectations regarding security in a projected future (Kaufmann 1973, 156-69). 
At the same time, the notion of “war” has proven to be a powerful symbolic 
instrument to mobilize fear and anxiety and to prepare the ground for the adop-
tion of exceptional security measures. The way in which the fight against ter-
rorism has been reframed as a “global war” attests to this point.  
Security thus has become a principle in governing and ordering society: this 
is expressed and captured in our notion of the security dispositive. Although its 
orientation is towards the future, and rests upon perceptions and imaginations 
regarding these future threats, its effects in terms of mobilizing governmental 
practices and expert knowledge and implementing exceptional measures are in 
the present. By historicizing security, it should be possible to unpack the dy-
namics, methods, and normative implications of security and safety on a con-
ceptual level as well as through empirical research.  
To be more concrete: we can trace the concept of security dispositives back 
to the discourses of ‘the fight against crime’, the ‘war on terror’ or – more 
recently – ‘child abuse’ and ‘cyber security’ – terms that refer both to concrete 
incidents or threats but that are also accompanied by prioritizing, politicizing, 
certain norms and values and new techniques and measures. 
Historians in the field of security are often at work in the field of the ‘securi-
ty dispositives’ of the modern state – as it developed since the 18th century. 
Modernity saw the differentiation and departmentalization of security policy 
into welfare policy, police, intelligence (Staatsschutz), and military and foreign 
security (Conze 1984). However, the main underlying security dispositive since 
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the 18th century can be defined as starting with the following elements that 
weave in and out and change over time: 
- a rather spatial orientation (e.g., fixed on city, state borders) 
- the territorial state brings with it the difference between domestic and exter-
nal security 
- a strong aspect of “taming the future” (Zwierlein 2010) 
- the bourgeois society and community as actor and object of “security” 
- values like order, discipline, commonwealth as to be protected 
- new technologies (of information, construction, communication) that are 
perceived to enhance “security” 
- security as process becomes the effect and the producer of frames of politi-
cal action 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century these security dispositives became 
engrained in the political game.  
By using the conceptual tool kit provided to us by the Copenhagen School, 
the development and change of these security dispositives can be analysed over 
time. For example, if we look at the framing of church and religion as a prob-
lem of order and security the question arises: how is it that in certain periods of 
time specific religious minorities took centre stage in security-policy? Which 
risk-analyses belong to the security dispositives of the war against terrorism in 
the seventies or today? Was it the same for The Netherlands and Germany? 
Which actors had an influence at what time and why on security policy? Why 
did private parties gain influence? These days, we often talk about the com-
mercialisation of security policy. But what about the arms dealers during the 
time of the Republic? Or the military-industrial complex of the first half of the 
20th century? And how did ideas and opinions about what was being threat-
ened change over time? Is terrorism a threat to the country, the society or the 
culture? Should the military protect our territory and borders or also ‘the public 
mind’? The ‘war on terror’ emerged as a new security dispositive since 2001, 
enabled by social media, and has led us to a new mode of security and risk 
governance involving techniques of ‘prepression, precaution and premedia-
tion’.  
3.2  The Connection of Security and Legitimacy 
This brings us to the second theme in this cluster. For an emerging security 
dispositive to become grounded, to become a tool of governance and to take 
hold over a territory, its inhabitants, and society, and infer itself in state bu-
reaucracies, a sense of legitimacy is required. According to famous philoso-
phers on the concept of legitimacy such as Max Weber, Seymour Lipset and 
David Easton, legitimation does not only comprise political and public support 
for the ‘system’, but also belief in that system and acceptance of its correspond-
ing norms and values (Lipset 1959; Easton 1965). Legitimation is moreover 
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understood as a process of normative evaluation from which the “ascribed 
quality of legitimacy” emerges. The opposite, a back-and-forth process of 
contestation that undermines the existing legitimacy of institutions, is called 
delegitimation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 112; Parkinson 2003, 184; Steffek 
2009, 314; Van Leeuwen 2008). In “legitimatory statements,” statements are 
articulated that (de)legitimize a specific object of legitimation, drawing on 
specific “patterns of (de)legitimation” (Krell-Laluhová and Schneider 2004, 
17). Legitimizing security measures, institutions, laws, or other security-driven 
activities, evolved in time, involved different discourses and spoke to different 
conditions. In what way were different security dispositives over time able to 
solicit and produce new forms of political legitimation, thereby presenting 
themselves as new ordering modes or principles for democratic societies 
(Zwierlein 2010)? 
If we take “war” or “war preparations” as one of the classical security pre-
rogatives of the modern nation state, and thus as a security dispositive, different 
attempts to legitimate war and its ensuing resources, funds, institutions, and 
organizational preparations can be identified. Leonhard made a first attempt in 
mapping and analyzing evolving patterns of arguing, legitimizing, and mobiliz-
ing for war in four western countries (France, Germany, the UK, and the US) in 
the 19th and 20th century. His dispositive of “Bellizismus” was legitimized by 
pointing to the perceived natural needs of the emerging nation states, mobilized 
by the metaphysical idea of a nation’s “manifest destiny” and thus in itself 
legitimizing the rise of the military-industrial complex as early as the late 19th 
century (Leonhard 2008, 148-9). Contrary to the security dispositive of the 
ancient régime, that, in its traditionalist and restorative sense, was directed 
along notions of tradition, order, sovereignty, and divine rule, new values of 
nation, patrie, constitution, and honor became operative, creating new types of 
warring societies and security regimes (Leonhard 2008, 187). Security-policy 
thus carried metaphysical meaning, according to Leonhard. The way this mean-
ing was constructed, legitimized and spilled over into policy in a sometimes 
almost religious fashion differed per country over time.  
For historians, it can be clarifying to trace the progression of security dis-
positives (or political agenda setting in the security-domain) and the processes 
of political legitimation belonging to those dispositives through time, by using 
the concepts mentioned in this introduction. Without turning history into a 
social science (and eroding its narrative-empirical base), concepts used in the 
social sciences enable us to gain a deeper insight into historical processes. The 
connection between security and political legitimacy opens up an interesting 
series of questions, for example those pointing to the creation and effect of 
conspiracy theories. Since security threats are likely to trigger processes of 
‘othering’ and creating so-called ‘in- and outgroups’, and moreover feed on 
people’s needs to rationalize extreme misfortune or disasters happening to 
them, a threat very easily may slip into the construction of collective conspira-
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cies. The hausse of antizionist conspiracy theories around 1900 or the emer-
gence of conspiracy-theories after ‘9/11’ underlines this point (Hofstadter 
1996; Aupers 2002; McArthur 1995; Goldzwig 2002; Bartlett and Miller 2010; 
White 2001; Benz 2007).  
3.3  Entering the Conspiracy 
Thus, a very specific nexus between security dispositives and political legiti-
macy is presented by the conspiracy. The expansion, construction, consolida-
tion and mobilization of security regimes in modern nation states are connected 
with the recurring theme of the ‘conspiracy’, as an essential rhetorical, practical 
and philosophical tool of legitimizing these regimes. ‘Conspiracy’ functions as 
a legitimizing argument, serving and fuelling a larger, encompassing security 
regime. For example, it offered the French revolutionaries a dispositive to 
frame and identifying its enemies, the corrupt elites, the old noblemen of the 
ancien regime and their accomplices, and to construct the ‘referent object’ of 
their security thrust: the revolutionary constitution and the ‘sans culottes’. The 
conspiracy dispositive could on the other hand also be appropriated by opposi-
tional actors, factions of parties to legitimize resistance to the perceived despot-
ic rule that conspired to continue the exploitation and repression of the true 
‘people’ and perverted the ‘nation’.  
Let me offer a brief note on conspiracy theories, as analyzed by political 
scientists in recent years. It can be conceptualized as a postmodern system of 
interpretation and signifying that is directly and inherently coupled with dis-
trust against authorities, institutions and expert knowledge (Aupers 2000, 
321).1 Conspiracy thinking has its political dimensions (MacArthur 1995, 40-
1). On the one hand, conspiracy thinking functions as a political mechanism for 
oppressed or disadvantaged groups seeking redress for their conditions; on the 
other hand, conspiracy thinking can be used as a political weapon by political 
entrepreneurs claiming to speak for a threatened majority. Those who feel 
negated by politics, or consider themselves to be insignificant, powerless and 
voiceless, find a powerful explanation for their feelings of unease in the rheto-
ric of conspiracy thinking. Goldzwig cites Mark Fenster (1991), who argues 
that conspiracy thinking is a way of becoming political relevant for those who 
have no access to traditional and formal political channels, or find politics 
incomprehensible and encircled with layers of secrecy. Especially political 
institutions and political elites are a grateful object and crystallization point to 
work of one’s anger and discomfort (Goldzwig 2002, 496).  
Conspiracy thinking can also have its effect on more extreme manifestations 
of distrust. Conspiracy thinking is integral part of almost every extremist ideol-
                                                             
1  We owe the paragraph on the nature of conspiracy to Jelle van Buuren, PhD at the Centre 
for Terrorism, who works on modern day conspiracy theories in the Netherlands. 
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ogy in which the legitimacy of the existing political and societal order is con-
demned (Bartlett and Miller 2010, 21; White 2001, 940). Conspiracy thinking 
is more than helpful in finding and localizing external enemies that can be 
blamed for problems that otherwise remain impersonal and abstract. Secret 
elite groups or under class parasites are believed to conspire in a bet to control 
history. Social conflicts are being simplified by attributing all kind of problems 
to demonized populations (idem, 954). Goldzwig argues that the popularity of 
conspiracy thinking is a sign of political disenfranchisement and can be the 
forerunner of violence (idem, 498). Acts of terrorism in the United States (the 
Oklahoma Bombing, de UNA-bomber, the Branch Davidians) for instance had 
political-ideological stamps, but also indistinct and paranoia motives that can 
be subscribed to conspiracy thinking and, for their part, nourished other con-
spiracy theories. 
Rather than elaborating on this universalist, social scientist model, we like to 
bring the ‘conspiracy dispositive’ back to history, and to analyze it as a ‘second 
tier’ or functional ‘sub-security’ dispositive, encompassing both ‘real’ and 
‘imagined’ conspiracies as historical forces (Caumanns and Niendorf 2001). 
Rather than attempting to discern between ‘real’ conspiracies and purported 
ones, we focus on its functional character in a given moment of time. On an 
epistemological plane, distinguishing between imagination and reality is im-
possible, since a conspiracy theory is preconceived to rationalize and integrate 
all cognitive dissonances into its master narrative, leaving no room for alterna-
tive explanations. Therefore, not the content, but conspiracy as a function bear-
er and legitimizing tool is being addressed here. The dawn of early modern 
history, beginning with Machiavelli already saw the rise of political theories on 
conspiracies, although in late mediaeval and early modern times, the congiure 
lacked at first the transcendental dimension (Fasano Guarini 2010, 155-207). 
However, only after a modern approach to politics arrived, defined by a 
combination of both rational, ‘worldly’ components and non-rational, transcen-
dental or even apocalyptic visions on society, the nation or the state, ‘conspira-
cies’ became an important political dispositive directing actions and planning. 
A first instance of operating conspiracy dispositives in order to serve political 
aims took place during the ‘confessional age’, when Calvinists and Puritans 
and to a lesser extent also Catholics adopted anti-Christian conspiracies to 
delegitimize the other confession’s place in politics (Thorp 1984; Coward and 
Swann 2004; Bercé and Guarini 1996; Zwierlein 2006; Benz 2007). From that 
time onwards, conspiracies were common to modern politics, involving either 
‘counter-revolutionaries’, ‘terrorists’, ‘Jews’, ‘Jesuits’ or ‘Muslims’. In almost 
all instances, they served as a leverage and legitimizing tool to enhance and 
underpin existing or emerging security regimes. Or: to legitimize counter-
securitization moves and resistance to securitizing agencies (Graaf 2012). 
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To summarize, without claiming to provide a full theory of conspiracy theories, 
modern conspiracy dispositives share a number of common traits, amongst 
which: 
- Their attributive status: ‘conspiracy’ is predominantly attributed to historical 
actors or entities by others; hardly anyone would claim to belong to an ‘anti-
Christian conspiracy’ (at least, without being tortured into admitting as 
much).  
- Their purported transnational character: a conspiracy dispositive’s legi-
timacy is enhanced by pointing to the ‘alien’, ‘foreign’, ‘anti-national’ or 
‘anti-patriotic’ components it harbours. Conspiracies thereby explicitly go 
against the grain of modernity’s differentiating character: conspiracies un-
dermine the clear-cut labour division of domestic/external security 
- Their epistemological impossibility: conspiracies are conceived as hidden, 
invisible, operating behind the scenes, along the lines of a ‘master plan’, a 
‘dark force’ in the background. Everything that points to a more mundane 
explanation is re-written to fit into this preconfigured notion of the conspira-
tional master plan, thereby ruling out any empirical, sobering approach to 
the conspiracy dispositive. 
- Their destructive potential: purported conspiracies bear the grain of comple-
te annihilation of society, the nation, the state of the political regime by me-
ans of infiltrating, subverting, infesting and infecting them.  
- These traits also hold true, mutatis mutandis, if applied to the ‘counter con-
spiracy dispositives’, as arising from the heart of society and directed 
against the state or the ruling classes.  
- However, notwithstanding the hybris and megalomania attributed to the 
conspirational threat, the dispositive also holds the possibility of its sudden 
revelation, its discovery and of nipping it in the bud – provided, the counter-
conspirators or anti-conspirators receive full control and resources to make 
sure of that. 
Both dispositives do need, use and feed each other: 
- The state refers to conspiracies to identify and frame its ‘enemies’, mobilize 
support against them, vote for more resources to combat this threat and to 
legitimize adoption of new security measures and laws. 
- Non-state actors operate the conspiracy dispositive with the same aim of 
delegitimizing the state’s rule and ruling practices. 
- Both dispositives invoke a sense of urgency, immediacy and inevitability of 
a given security threat that calls for counter-activities that are framed as ur-
gent, immediate and inevitable as the purported threats. 
- Conspiracy dispositives also involve and draw on new informational, com-
municational and technical means to make visible and disseminate the 
‘image of the enemy’ amongst the various constituencies. We argue that 
new conspiracy dispositives almost always also went hand in glove with the 
invention, application and professionalization of new new techniques of in-
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formation, communication and transportation even in early modern times, 
that were inferred into existing security dispositives and gradually shaped 
and changed these. 
4.  Historicizing Security – A Methodological Approach 
Security history can be written as a continuous rise, flow and changing series of 
security dispositives, operated and legitimized through a number of second tier 
dispositives, such as the stated conspiracy dispositive. Applying these concepts 
unpacks the development of modern developments of security history and 
opens a window on the changes in security thinking over time. Dispositives 
mark a contraction, often a moment in time and space, where new techniques, 
scientific methods, approaches, political constellations and outbursts of discon-
tent weave into a ‘heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material ele-
ments to take on social issues’ (Foucault 2004; Aradau and Van Munster 2008, 
24), enabled through the discovery of industrial and commercial applications of 
new information- and communication technologies, used and embraced both by 
state representatives, commercial agents and ‘security subject’/agents of inse-
curity. 
With this Special Issue, we would like to introduce and to operationalize this 
new way of analyzing security history and to test some of our hypotheses con-
cerning the history and structure of the two dispositives. We make the claim 
that modern security planning hinges on a new way of perceiving the proximate 
and distal context through new means of informational, communicational and 
technological means. The emergence of anonymous, free flowing news reports, 
through leaflets, diplomatic channels, public declarations and increasing new 
forms of ‘journals’ since the 16th, 17th century enabled a greater plurality of 
actors to participate in or receive knowledge of the process of political decision 
making. This communication or ‘news’ revolution (overlapping, but dissimilar 
to Habermas normative concept of the emergence of a ‘kritische Öffentlich-
keit’) offered an anonymous representation of the contemporaries’ ‘world’, 
which they could monitor and interpret as they saw fit. 
This news revolution was a landmark in the development of modern politi-
cal thinking (Zwierlein 2006, 198-294). It opened up the confined space and 
time of the local village or the individual court and enabled citizens to tune in 
into a larger community, it fundamentally altered the spatial and territorial 
landscapes of the early modern states, thereby also making deep inroads into 
the realm of security thinking. Modernity and the rise of the modern nation 
state on the one hand saw the differention and division between domestic and 
external security, and the professionalization and departmentalization of poli-
tics. On the other hand, the new modes of informing, reading, interpreting, 
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transporting and communicating enabled citizens to develop a bird’s eye per-
spective on daily, or rather weekly or monthly, business of European politics.  
This communicational dimension also was inferred into the security domain: 
producing, framing and identifying security threats went into a substantial 
higher gear. Conspiracy pamphlets, letters, texts proliferated through modern 
history, and went hand in glove with new representations of the world. The 
perception of the world as an interconnected, manageable space returned in 
exaggerated forms in the idea of conspiracies being able to operate globally, as 
being responsible for seemingly disconnected hazards and chances, interpreting 
coincidences as causalities. Conspiracy texts – either formulated by state secu-
rity actors or by non-state actors – often interpret a sequence of actions (meet-
ings of heads of states, military or diplomatic activities) portrayed in the media 
as symptoms of an underlying master plot, against which another master plot 
has to be put in action to neutralize the first one. 
At the same time, as soon as the conspiracy idea was rooted and accepted by 
specific authorities, and possibly legitimized by the public at large, it easily 
dictated its own conspirational governance logics: leading to expansion of 
executive power, metastazing bureaucracies and criminalizing suspect seg-
ments of the population.  
In historical case studies on conspiracy as a modern day security dispositive, 
special attention thus should be devoted to  
1) The securitizing actors. Who speaks security, who operates the conspiracy 
dispositif; which party, faction of organization wields enough power to per-
suade and perform its securitizing moves?  
2) The way the referent subject is defined, e.g. how broad or narrow the con-
spiring circles are cast. Are they located in a specific gang, family, city or 
territory, or connected to a confession, culture, ideology, or even described 
in an eugenetical sense?  
3) The way the ‘referent object’ is perceived, e.g. that what has to be defended 
and prevented from being threatened: what is purportedly at stake? Are vul-
nerabilities located along the territorial borders, do they regard the person of 
the ruler, the elites or is the national culture, cohesion and ‘way of living’ as 
such considered to be endangered?  
4) The conjunctures, flows and peaks of conspiracy communication. When do 
conspiracy allegations emerge? How do new informational, communica-
tional and/or technological techniques serve to enhance this conspiracy dis-
positive? We introduce ‘technologies of imagination’ (Schinkel 2011) – 
techniques, aimed at visualizing and representing the threat – as an im-
portant factor here. New means of gathering intelligence, of drafting reports 
and estimates do matter, as do the velocities with which arms carriers can be 
operated and transported. 
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5) And what new modes of security governance and risk assessment techniques 
are invoked, legitimized and deployed by the embracement of the conspira-
tional threat on the agenda. 
By answering these questions in different countries over different periods of 
time, and focusing on the specific sub-type of the conspiracy dispositive we are 
able to unpack the way security regimes change over time, thereby not only 
underlining but also operating the constructivist character of security and con-
spiracy politics in Modern History.  
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